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Economic Analysis of a Japanese Air Pollution Regulation: An 
Optimal Retirement Problem under Vehicle Type Regulation in the 
NOx–Particulate Matter Law 
Kazuyuki Iwata and Toshi H. Arimura 
Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the vehicle type regulation that was introduced under the 
Automobile Nitrogen Oxides–Particulate Matter Law to mitigate air pollution problems in Japanese 
metropolitan areas. The vehicle type regulation effectively sets various timings of vehicle retirement by 
the first registration year and by type. However, there was no consideration of cost or efficiency in 
choosing the timing of retirement. We set and solve an optimal problem to maximize the social net benefit 
under the current framework of the vehicle type regulation. The analysis finds that the net benefit can 
increase by about 104 percent if the optimal retirement timing is chosen. Further, we confirm that even a 
simple alteration of retirement timing can increase the social net benefit by 13 percent. Thus, we confirm 
the importance of an ex-ante quantitative policy evaluation, a regulatory impact analysis, from the 
viewpoint of efficiency.  
Key Words:  air pollution, regulatory impact analysis, NOx-PM law, cost–benefit analysis, 
optimal retirement model 
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Economic Analysis  of a Japanese Air Pollution Regulation: An 
Optimal Retirement Problem under Vehicle Type Regulation in the 
NOx–Particulate Matter Law 
Kazuyuki Iwata and Toshi H. Arimura ∗ 
1. Introduction 
To mitigate air pollution in Japanese metropolitan areas, a variety of pollution regulations 
have been placed on stationary sources, such as facilities, and on mobile sources, such as 
automobiles. As a result, emission of sulfur dioxides has successfully been reduced. However, 
levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) did not improve through the 1980s. The increasing emissions 
from mobile sources were said to be a major reason. In response, in June 1992 the Japanese 
government introduced the Automobile NOx Regulation Law to control automobile emissions. 1 
This law targeted the metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka, which were designated 
as nonattainment areas. 
Despite these efforts, the concentration of NOx in metropolitan areas still did not improve 
in the 1990s. Among the roadside air pollution monitoring stations in the nonattainment areas, 
only 43 percent met the national ambient air quality standard for NOx in 1998. The achievement 
of the environmental standard for particulate matter (PM) was even worse. Only 36 percent of 
the roadside air pollution monitoring stations achieved the ambient air quality standard for PM in 
1998. The reason for these failures is considered to be the heavy usage of diesel trucks. 
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Given these situations, the Automobile NOx-PM Law (NOx-PM Law),2 a revised version 
of the Automobile NOx Regulation Law, was legislated in 2001. This new law is intended to 
decrease the concentration of PM as well as NOx in the nonattainment areas. 
The NOx-PM Law has a provision called the vehicle type regulation. The vehicle type 
regulation prohibits the use and registration of automobiles in the nonattainment areas, after 
certain grace periods, unless the automobiles satisfy the 2005 emissions standard, which is 
defined in the law. The 2005 emissions standard is more stringent than previous standards.3 
The NOx-PM Law is unique in enforcing the regulation on vehicles currently used. Most 
regulations on vehicles are enforced on newly sold vehicles; those already used by consumers or 
industries are exempted. For example, under earlier laws, stringent emissions standards were 
applicable only to new cars; owners of old vehicles with more polluting emissions intensity did 
not receive any penalty for using their older dirty vehicles. The regulation is called vehicle type 
regulation because the timing of the ban depends on vehicle type and the first registration year. 
For instance, a standard-size diesel truck newly registered in 1989 was banned in the 
nonattainment area in 2004, whereas a diesel passenger car newly registered in the same year 
could be used until 2005. 
How was the timing of ban determined? The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications conducts regulatory impact analyses in Japan. An ex-post evaluation of the 
NOx-PM Law by the Ministry reveals that there were no cost estimates of the regulation. 4 Thus, 
the timing of the ban for each vehicle type for each registration year was chosen without any 
analysis of cost or efficiency. 
The vehicle type regulation exhibits an example of a command-and-control approach 
toward air pollution problems. Economic theory predicts that command-and-control regulations 
do not necessarily maximize the social welfare since there is no price mechanism to promote 
                                                 
2 The official name of the law is “the Law concerning special measures for total emission reduction of Nitrogen 
Oxides and Particulate Matter from automobiles in specified areas” (revised June 2001). The Ministry of the 
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efficiency among polluters. On the other hand, economic theory claims that economic incentives 
such as a pollution tax can maximize the social welfare. However, the introduction of such a tax 
often is politically infeasible. Even if a tax can be introduced, the amount of the tax often is 
much lower than the marginal externality cost (MEC), which is necessary to maximize the social 
welfare. 
This study proposes a third avenue. We examine the degree to which a regulator can 
increase social welfare by conducting a careful ex-ante regulatory impact analysis of alternative 
regulations. Although Arimura and Iwata (2008) found that the benefit of the current vehicle 
type regulation exceeds the cost, Arimura and Iwata (2006) found that there are deviations in 
marginal abatement cost across polluters. They imply that an alternative regulation could have 
achieved better social welfare just by adopting different enforcement timing. In this study, we 
examine how changes in years of ban for each vehicle type can increase the social welfare. Thus, 
we restrict the scope of the study to practical alternative command-and-control type regulations. 
Several studies have examined the retirement of old vehicles as air pollution control 
policy. Lumbreras et al. (2008) show, with their simulation, that the renewal of old vehicles is an 
efficient way, among other regulations, of controlling air pollution problems. Other studies such 
as Dill (2004) and Alberini et al. (1995, 1996) examined voluntary retirement programs. This 
paper is the first study to examine a compulsory retirement program. 
Section 2 outlines the vehicle type regulation with its background. This is followed in 
Section 3 by the model component estimating the cost of the regulation. Section 4 illustrates the 
model to measure the emissions reduction benefit due to the regulation. The solution to an 
optimizing problem is described with discussion in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background of the NOx-PM Law and the Compliance Methods 
The NOx-PM Law in Japan is unique in enforcing earlier replacement of older vehicles 
with new vehicles compliant with the new stringent emissions standards. The law sets the 2005 
emissions target, the most stringent emissions vehicle standard for NOx and PM to date. More 
importantly, after a grace period the regulation bans the use and the registration of older vehicles 
in the nonattainment areas unless they satisfy the 2005 emissions standard. For example, 
standard trucks initially sold in 1990 cannot be registered after 2005. 
The timing of a ban depends on vehicle type. First, vehicles are divided into the 
following categories: trucks, buses, special-use vehicles, and passenger cars. Second, each Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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category is divided into standard size and small size. Finally, passenger vehicles are divided into 
two groups depending on the frequency of legally required inspections; some passenger cars 
must be inspected every year while most passenger cars must be inspected every two years. 
Thus, vehicles are categorized into 10 types. 
In addition, the timing of a ban depends on the first registration year. Vehicles registered 
before 2003 face the ban unless they satisfy the 2005 emissions target. Table 1 shows the 
terminal years for 10 vehicle types for each registration year. 
Owners of old vehicles have several alternatives as compliance methods. First, the 
owners can just retire their old cars without a replacement. Surveys by the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (JAMA) (2005a, 2005b) found that only a few vehicle owners chose 
retirement for trucks. Second, they could replace their old vehicles with new ones complying 
with the stringent emissions standard. JAMA (2005a, 2005b) found that most of the truck owners 
chose to purchase the same type of new vehicles in response to the regulation. Thus, this paper 
focuses on the replacement with new vehicles of the same type as the compliance method. 
Notably, diesel trucks are the most affected by vehicle type regulation under the NOx-PM 
Law. Figure 1 illustrates the transition of the emissions standards for passenger cars and diesel 
trucks. While gasoline passenger vehicles have had to satisfy relatively stringent emissions 
targets for years, diesel trucks and passenger cars have faced less stringent emissions targets until 
recently. Even in the late 1990s, there was a still gap between gasoline vehicles and diesel 
vehicles in the stringency of the regulation. Thus, most old trucks must be replaced with new 
trucks. On the other hand, a relatively small share of passenger vehicles must be replaced 
because the emissions standards for passenger cars were already stringent in the later 1990s. 
3. Cost of the Regulation 
Following the discussion above, we focus on replacement with new vehicles as the 
compliance method. We compute the cost of the regulation in the following steps. First, for each 
registration year and each vehicle type, we identify how many vehicles are facing the 
replacement requirement. Second, we calculate the cost of the regulation per vehicle type. 
Finally, we sum costs over years and vehicle types. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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3.1 Identification of Regulated Vehicles 
We used the Survey of Automobile Possession (SAP)5 by the Automobile Inspection and 
Registration Association to obtain information on the registered vehicles in March 2003. In SAP, 
about 3.9 million vehicles excluding gasoline passenger cars were identified in nonattainment 
areas. For each vehicle, we checked vehicle type and registration year. Further, we verified if the 
emissions intensity of each registered vehicle met the 2005 standards. If not, the car is subject to 
the regulation. Table 2 shows the number of vehicles facing the retirement requirement for each 
vehicle type in the nonattainment areas in 2003. The total number is approximately 2.6 million 
vehicles. 
3.2 Compliance Cost per Vehicle 
The compliance cost due to the regulation can be defined as the difference between the 
cost with and without the regulation. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of the regulation on vehicle 
owners. Without the regulation, a type m  vehicle could be used for average life of  m L  years. 
The regulation, however, enforces the replacement at year  rm T  for a type m  vehicle with the first 
registration year r . The regulation shortens the life of the vehicle by  rm Y , which we refer to as 
reduced years. Because the reduced year is a function of  rm T and  m L , we denote it as 
) , ( m rm rm L T Y . Under the current regulation, timing of replacement  rm T  is defined as in Table 1. 
This study changes  rm T  to maximize the net benefit of the regulation. 
In estimating the cost of the regulation, we use the framework by Oka et al. (2007). The 
surveys by JAMA (2005a, 2005b) reveal that most owners do not change the vehicle type when 
replacing. Thus, we can safely assume that vehicle users do not change the vehicle type. Further, 
we assume that the vehicle prices are constant over time in spite of the regulation. 
We expand the approach of Oka et al. (2007) by adding profit from the sales of the 
affected vehicles. The owners of vehicles can sell their vehicles to used car markets in attainment 
areas when they face the enforced retirement in the nonattainment areas. The regulation enforces 
the vehicle owners to sell their vehicles earlier than otherwise by the years of shortening. This 
early sale of used vehicles increases the profit because newer cars have higher values in the 
market. Therefore, we can define the compliance cost as the difference between the additional 
replacement cost and the additional profit on sale. 
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First, we define the replacement cost. We calculate the compliance cost at the timing of 
the replacement. Let  mw P  be the purchasing price of vehicle type m  with weight w. We have 
information on weight w because vehicle prices differ by weight even for the same vehicle type. 
Following Oka et al. (2007), we assume that prices do not change over time. With the regulation 
in place, the replacement cost is equal to the price of the new vehicle, mw P , at the time of the 
replacement. The replaced vehicle, however, would have been used for  ) , ( m rm rm L T Y  more years 
if it were not for the regulation. Let i denote the interest rate. Then the replacement cost without 
the regulation, evaluated at the time of the ban, is the discounted present value of a new vehicle 
price, that is,  () rm mw Y i P × − exp . Hence, the replacement cost 
rm T
rmw Cr  of typem vehicle that is 
banned in year  rm T  is expressed as 
[ ] )} , ( exp{ 1 m rm rm mw
Trm
rmw L T Y i P Cr × − − =                                                                               (1) 
Second, we define the profit from the sales to the used car market. The vehicle owners 
sell their old vehicles to used car markets  ) , ( m rm rm L T Y  years earlier with the regulation than 
without the regulation. As there is generally a negative correlation between vehicle price and 
age, owners gain the profit on sale by selling them with the regulation. Thus, we use the yearly 
average depreciation rate  m sr  of vehicle type m  provided by Kuroda et al. (1997) to incorporate 
the relation between vehicle price and age into our model. For example, they reveal that the 
yearly average depreciation rate of a standard truck is 25.7 percent. The difference between the 
profit on sale with and without the regulation, 
rm T
rmw Cs , evaluated at the time of ban  rm T  can be 
calculated by using equation (2). 
)}] , ( exp{ )} ) , ( ( exp{
)} ( [exp{




L T Y i r L T Y T sr
r T sr P Cs
rm
× − × − + × − −
− × − =
                          (2) 
The first and second terms in the brackets represent the profit on the sale of old vehicles 
evaluated at the time of ban with and without the regulation, respectively. 
The compliance cost 
rm T
rmw C  is the difference between the replacement cost 
rm T
rmw Cr  and the 
profit on sale 
rm T
rmw Cs . Thus, it can be defined as the following equation: 





rmw Cs Cr C − =                                                                                                          (3) 
The calculation of the compliance costs in equations (1) and (2) requires the average life 
remaining of vehicles  m L  when there is no regulation. We estimated  m L  by using 2000 vehicle 
registration data to exclude the influence of the NOx-PM Law, which was legislated in 2001. The 
results are shown in Table 3. The procedure is detailed in the appendix. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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From Tables 1 and 3, we can obtain reduced years  rm Y  under the current NOx-PM Law. 
Table 4 exhibits the reduced years under the current vehicle type regulation. For instance, with 
the current regulation standard trucks registered in 1990 can be used until 2005, when the vehicle 
is 15 years old. The average life remaining for 15-year-old standard trucks is 4.84 years, which is 
the reduced year for the standard truck registered in 1990. 
Truck prices by capacity load are collected from Japan Trucking Association (2004). 
Prices of passenger cars are obtained from the Japan Automobile Dealers Association (2000) for 
each vehicle type by taking sample means of each make. 
3.3 Number of Replaced Vehicles 
Table 2 identifies the number of vehicles in 2003 that did not comply with the 2005 
emissions standard. However, some of them will not be affected by the vehicle type regulation 
for two reasons. First, some vehicles would be replaced before they face the terminal years due 
to other reasons such as mechanical failure or accidents as a natural part of the replacement 
process. We refer to this replacement as natural replacement. 
Let 
rm T
rmwj N  represent the number of type m  vehicles at  rm T  in region j . Let the survival 
rate of a k -year-old vehicle be  () k sm . Then, following the process of natural replacement, 
rm T
rmwj N  
can be counted as follows: 
) 2003 ( / ) (
2003 r s r T s N N m rm m rmwj
T
rmwj
rm − − × =                                                                           (4) 
For example, in 2003 there were 581,192 standard trucks with the first registration year of 1990 
in nonattainment areas that were not compliant with the 2005 emissions standard. By the time 
they faced the ban in 2005, however, 70,949 of them would have been replaced as the result of 
the natural replacement process. Thus, only 510,243 vehicles would face the ban in 2005. 
Second, a small portion of vehicle owners retire their vehicles without buying another 
vehicle when they face the registration ban by the vehicle type regulation. We use repurchasing 
rate  mj rp  to capture the share of the vehicles to be replaced, that is,  ) 1 ( mj rp −  portion of vehicles 
are retired due to the regulation. Then, the number of vehicles replaced due to the regulation 
rm T




rmwj N rp NR × =                                                                                                          (5) 
To capture regional differences, we computed  mj rp  by region for each vehicle type from 
JAMA (2005a, 2005b). Because JAMA (2005a, 2005b) provide the information on small and Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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standard trucks only, we assume that the repurchasing rates for buses and special-use vehicles 
are same as trucks and that the rates for passenger vehicles are equal to one. 
3.4 Calculation of Total Cost 
We calculate the compliance cost for each vehicle type, region, first registration year, and 
weight by year. Then, we sum the compliance cost over these components and compute the 
discounted present value of the cost evaluated at year 2004. Following a previous study, we 
assume that all the vehicles are retired after 21 years.6 Thus, all the vehicles sold before the 
stringent emissions standard will be retired by 2024. Thus, total cost TC  is defined as 








NR C t i TC } ) 2004 ( exp{
2024
2004
                                             (6) 
We use a discount rate of 3 percent to calculate the total cost of repurchasing vehicles. 
The total cost of the current regulation was 521 billion yen. 
3.5 Discussion of Cost Estimates 
We would like to make some remarks on our cost estimates. First, our analysis does not 
include the maintenance cost in the calculation. Due to data limitations, we could not incorporate 
this point. If the maintenance cost rises as the vehicle ages, replacement of old vehicles will 
reduce maintenance costs (Spitzley et al. 2005). Thus, our cost may overestimate the true cost. 
Second, some freight companies possessing multiple vehicles may use newer cars more 
often than older vehicles (Nomura 2002). Thus, if the owners replace their old vehicles with new 
ones, they are more likely to use newer vehicles, which have higher fuel economy than older 
ones. Thus, the operation cost becomes smaller when older vehicles are replaced. Due to the data 
restrictions, this aspect of the regulation was also not incorporated in the analysis. Again, there is 
a possibility of overestimation. 
Finally, our analysis did not incorporate replacement with a used car as a compliance 
method because the price of used vehicles is unavailable. JAMA (2005a, 2005b) finds that the 
share is small. In this analysis, we assumed that all users replace their old vehicle with a new 
vehicle. However, they have the option of purchasing approved used vehicles. Since the prices of 
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used vehicles are smaller than new ones, our calculation of the cost may overestimate the true 
cost. 
Overall, if there is any bias in our estimate of the cost, our estimates are likely to 
overestimate cost. We believe that the amount of bias is limited. 
4. Benefit: Health Benefit Due to the Emissions Reduction 
As the benefit of the regulation, we estimate the health benefit due to the emissions 
reduction. To obtain the emissions reduction, we compute the emissions with and without the 
regulation. We must convert vehicle numbers to the emissions through the numbers of kilometers 
driven. We use the following equation to estimate emissions: 
Emissions(g) = (Emissions Intensity)(g/km) × (Mileage)(km/vehicle) × (Vehicle Numbers)     (7) 
Note that the vehicle type regulation reduces the emissions intensity. We estimate emissions by 
vehicle type, weight, and fuel type since the emissions intensities depend on all three of these 
factors. 
We expand the model introduced in Arimura and Iwata (2008). More specifically, we 
change vehicle mileage depending on vehicle age. We use the adjusted rate of vehicle mileage to 
incorporate this assumption. 
4.1 Emissions without the Regulation 
First, as a baseline, we compute the emissions without the vehicle type regulation. 
Emissions standards for new vehicles have become more stringent over the years. Therefore, 
even without the vehicle type regulation, emissions will decrease due to the natural replacement 
process; older vehicle are replaced with newer ones that have lower emissions intensities. 
We use  mwf e0  to denote emissions intensity for type m  vehicle with weight w and fuel 
type  f  (gasoline or diesel) that complies with the 2005 standard. Likewise, we use  rmwf e  to refer 
to emissions intensity initially registered in year r , that is, emissions intensity for older vehicles, 
and thus,  rmwf mwf e e < 0  for the same type, weight, and fuel. Further,  mj D  is used to denote 
mileage per vehicle in region j for vehicle type m . Then, without the regulation, emissions from 
type m  vehicle with weight w and fuel type  f  in yeart, 
t
rmwfj o E , , can be computed as follows: 
( ) mj
t




rmwfj o D N N e D N e E × − × + × × =
2003
0 ,                                          (8) Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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            Here 
t
rmwfj N  is the number of older vehicles still used in year t. Thus, the first term 
represents emissions from the existing older vehicles. In contrast, the term 
t
rmwfj rmwfj N N −
2003  
represents the number of older vehicles being replaced with new ones due to natural 
replacement. Thus, the second term represents the emissions from newer vehicles. 
4.2 Emissions with the Regulation 
Emissions with the regulation, 
t
rmwfj h E ,  from type m  vehicle with weight w and fuel 
type  f  in year t, are defined in equations (9a) and (9b). As equation (9a) represents annual 
emissions before all older vehicles face the registration ban, it is equivalent to (8). Equation (9b) 
represents annual emissions after the older vehicles are completely replaced with new ones. 
Thus, the emissions intensities used in (9b) are now  mwf e0  only. 






rmwfj h > × − × + × =
2003
0 ,                  (9a) 









rm rm ≤ × × − × + × =
2003
0 0 ,                   (9b) 
Note that 
t
rmwfj dr  denotes the adjusted rate of vehicle mileage of vehicle type m  with 
weight w and fuel type  f  in region  j in year t. We need this term for the following reason. 
Our model considers two compliance methods. The first method is to repurchase new 
vehicles and sell old ones. The second one is to dispose of old vehicles without repurchasing new 
ones. Therefore, the total number of vehicles in nonattainment areas will decrease due to the 
second compliance method. If we assume the mileage for each regulated vehicle is constant over 
time in the model, the adoption of the second compliance method decreases the total number of 
miles driven in the nonattainment areas. It is unlikely, however, that travel demand decreased 
because of the regulation. To handle this problem, in equation (10) we incorporate a constraint 
that the total number of miles driven is constant. That is, we increase mileage per vehicle as the 
number of vehicles decreases so that total vehicle mileage is constant over time. 
Let  rmwfj TD  represent the constant total amount of vehicle mileage. As we assume that 
rmwfj TD  is constant over time, 
t
rmwfj dr  varies subject to equation (10). The number of regulated 




rmwfj rmwfj NR N N + −
2003  and 
2003
rmwfj N  in equation (10), respectively. Therefore, the first and second equations in the right hand 
side of equation (10) represent the total amount of vehicle mileage after and before the banned 
year, respectively. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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t T if N D
















              (10) 
Since we choose  rm T  to maximize the social net benefit, the timing of switching from (9a) 
to (9b) changes. If the ban comes earlier ( rm T  becomes smaller), then the switching speeds up and 
so does the emissions reduction. 
4.3 Emissions Reduction 
In year t, the emissions reduction from vehicle type m  registered in year r  with weight 
w and fuel type  f  in region  j , 
t






rmwfj E E ER , , − =                                                                                                 (11) 
Thus, the emissions reduction in year t is given by summing equation (11) over the 





t ER TER                                                                                 (12) 
We obtain mileage data from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
(2001) for each area. The emissions coefficient information is taken from Suri-Keikau Inc. 
(2005) by fuel type, vehicle type, regulation adoption year, and emissions intensity by speed for 
both NOx and PM. 
4.4 Health Benefit: Externality Benefit 
To convert the emissions reduction into a monetary value, we use estimates from the 
literature. Table 5 exhibits the MEC estimates we use in our analysis. Koyama and Kishimoto 
(2001) estimate the median MEC of PM in Japan and show the upper and lower bounds of their 
estimates. 
For the benefit of NOx reduction, we use estimates from the European Union (NETCEN 
2002) because to our knowledge there is no appropriate study in Japan. The study reports the 
MEC of NOx in 15 European Union countries. Considering the high population density in Japan, 
we use the mean of the 15 countries as the lower bound of the estimates and use the highest 
value as the upper bound. We took the average of the upper and lower bounds as the median 
estimates for the MEC. In response to Viscusi and Aldy’s (2003) comment that estimates on the 
value of statistical life vary across studies, we also run the model with lower and upper bounds of 
the health benefit. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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We use 
p MEC  to represent the average MEC for pollutant  p  (NOx or PM). We assume 
a constant externality cost of the health problem. Then, the present discount value of the benefit 
of the emissions reduction TB, evaluated in 2004, is defined as follows: 
∑∑
=
× − × − =
2024
2004





p TER MEC t i TB                                                     (13) 
We close this section with a discussion on the direction of potential bias in the benefit 
estimations. On one hand, the externality cost is likely to be smaller as the air becomes cleaner. 
In this regard, our estimates may overestimate the health benefit since we assume a constant 
MEC. This overestimation, however, becomes relevant in the future. Thus, in terms of the 
present discount value, the size of the overestimation is expected to be small. 
On the other hand, our model does not incorporate any benefit of the emissions reduction 
other than a health benefit. For instance, reduction in PM is likely to improve visibility. From 
this viewpoint, our analysis may underestimate the benefit of the emissions reduction. Because 
we expect the size of the visibility benefit to be much smaller than the health benefit, we expect 
the bias in benefit estimates to be small. 
5. Simulation of Alternative Policies 
5.1 Optimal Retirement Model 
Using the cost and benefit equations specified above, we set an optimal problem to 
maximize the social net benefit. We change the final year of vehicle usage  rm T  to see how the net 
benefit changes. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of the model. The reduced year  rm Y  is a 
function of  rm T  and  m L , where  rm T  is the final year of usage of the vehicle initially registered in year 
r  and  m L  is the average life of the vehicle for type m . Changing  rm T  will change the timing of the 
replacement, which changes both the replacement cost 
rm T
rmw Cr  and the profit on sale 
rm T
rmw Cs  in (1) 
and (2), respectively. Further, it will change NR. 
Changes in  rm T  will also change the benefit of the regulation. First, it will change the 
timing that the old emissions intensity  r e  in year r  turns to the new emissions intensity  0 e . This 
change of the emissions intensity will change the emissions with regulation 
t
rmwfj h E , and, in turn, 
will affect the emissions with the regulation and emissions reduction 
t TER . 
           In this study, there are 10 vehicle types (m ) and 19 years of registration period (r ) 
subject to the regulation. Thus, there are 190 parameters ( rm T ) from which to choose to maximize 
the net benefit under the current policy framework. The optimization problem is defined as Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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} { TC TB MAX
rm T −                                                                                                                (14) 
where TB and TC  are defined in equations (13) and (6), respectively. The solution of the 
optimization with the point estimate of MEC is defined as optimal regulation (point estimate). 
5.2 Result of Optimal Regulation (Point Estimate) 
Table 6 exhibits the optimal retirement timing by vehicle type and registration years. We 
can point to the following findings. First, the simulation shows that most trucks should be 
replaced in 2004. This result comes from the fact that most diesel trucks have a high emissions 
intensity due to the lack of stringent emissions standards for diesel trucks (see Figure 1). Second, 
the model shows that old passenger vehicles should be exempted from the vehicle type 
regulation, while the optimal solution prohibits using newer passenger vehicles in 2004. This 
solution reflects the fact that the health benefit achieved from discarding newer vehicles is 
relatively larger than the cost because owners can sell them in used car markets at a high price. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the emissions trajectories with the current regulation and with the 
optimal regulation. The emissions path without any regulation is also shown as a reference case 
(the triangle mark). Both emissions trajectories decline over time even without the vehicle type 
regulation because of the natural replacement process. The emissions under the current vehicle 
type regulation are marked as the square. The regulation accelerates the decline of the emissions. 
Our simulation shows that the emissions (marked by empty circles) should be reduced much 
faster than under the current regulation for both NOx and PM. 
The optimal regulation increases the net benefit dramatically. As the base case, we can 
compute the net benefit of the current regulation by using the current terminal years shown in 
Table 1. The resulting net benefit of the current regulation is 681.2 billion yen. With the 
optimization, the net benefit is 1,388.5 billion yen. Thus, it can increase the net benefit by more 
than 104 percent. 
5.3 Uncertainty of Marginal Externality Cost 
We showed one result of optimal regulation with a point estimate of MEC in the previous 
subsection. In the literature, the estimate of MEC is known to have much uncertainty. To account 
for the uncertainty, we solve the optimization problem with other MEC estimates by using a 
sensitivity analysis. In particular, we solve two optimization problems with the lower and upper 
bound estimates of MECs. Tables 7 and 8 describe the solutions of  rm T  in the lower and upper 
bound estimates, respectively. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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The final year of vehicle usage  rm T  under the lower bound estimate persuades us to exempt 
older passenger vehicles and to accelerate the ban on using trucks. This result is similar to the 
point estimate. 
We observe two differences from the results with the point estimate of MEC. First, the 
first registration years of exempted passenger vehicles changes. Second, some of the small older 
trucks are exempted from the vehicle type regulation. Figures 4 and 5, which illustrate the NOx 
and PM emissions trajectories, also show that the pattern of both trajectories on lower bound 
estimation is close to the point estimate. 
The optimal retirement timing under the upper bound estimate shows that it is efficient to 
exempt older passenger vehicles and to accelerate the banned timing of trucks. This result is also 
similar to the solutions with point and lower bound estimates. The first registration year of 
exempted passenger vehicles differs from the previous two optimal estimates. Under the upper 
bound estimate, the solution also suggests that it is preferable to accelerate emissions reduction 
more than the current regulation (Figures 4 and 5). 
Increases in the social net benefit from the current regulation under the lower and upper 
bound estimates are described in Table 9. As the increases are 526.6 and 895.9 billion yen with 
the lower and upper bounds of MEC, respectively, we can conclude that the increase in social net 
benefit is huge whenever any MECs are used. 
5.4 Robustness Check on Optimal Regulation 
We made several assumptions in estimating the net benefit. These assumptions may 
affect our solution of the optimization problem and hence the estimates of the net benefit. Thus, 
in this subsection, we verify how the increase in social net benefit changes when we change the 
assumptions. If we could find that the social net benefit increases with alternative assumptions, 
we could robustly point out an important role of a regulatory impact analysis to improve the 
efficiency of command-and-control regulation. 
Here we change three assumptions about the profit on sale 
rm T
rmw Cs , the repurchasing rate 
mj rp , and the interest rate i. First, owners of regulated vehicles do not sell their old vehicles in 
used car markets (this means that  0 =
rm T
rmw Cs ). Second, all owners repurchase the same type of 
new vehicles ( 1 = mj rp ). Third, the interest rate is 7 percent rather than 3 percent. 
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5.4.1 First Case:   0 =
rm T
rmw Cs  
Our estimation model assumes that there is no profit on the sale of older vehicles. In 
other words, owners are assumed to dispose of their older vehicles without selling them in used 
car markets when they repurchase new vehicles. Thus, in calculating compliance cost we use 
only equation (1), and the total cost is larger than previous results. 
The optimization problems are solved with point, lower bound, and upper bound 
estimates of MEC. Results are shown on the top row of Table 10. The optimal retirement timing 
under the point estimate is 357.5 billion yen, an extensive increase in social net benefit. With 
both cases of the lower and upper bound estimates we can also recognize that the increases are 
large enough to justify the ex-ante regulatory analysis. 
 
5.4.2 Second Case:   0 =
rm T
rmw Cs  and  1 = mj rp   
In the second case, we consider that all owners choose to repurchase new vehicles as a 
compliance method. In addition, we assume that there is no profit on the sale of the older 
vehicles. This second case scenario generates the largest regulation cost. 
The middle row of Table 10 exhibits the net benefits resulting from the optimization 
problems with the point, lower, and upper bound estimates. Again, the optimal policy can 
increase the social net benefits with any of the three estimates of MEC. 
 
5.4.3 Third Case: i = 7 Percent 
The choice of interest rate affects both the cost and benefit. Thus, to examine the effects 
of the interest rate choice in the third case, we change the interest rate from 3 percent to 7 
percent. The results are shown in the bottom row of Table 10. We confirm that the net increase 
social welfare is great for the three MEC estimates. 
From these sensitivity analyses we can confirm that the optimal retirement regulation can 
increase the social net benefit regardless of the choice of the assumptions. Hence, in taking all 
the results of simulations into account, we can robustly conclude that there is inefficiency under 
the current regulation. This finding leads to the importance of an ex-ante quantitative regulatory 
impact analysis, such as this study, to improve the social welfare. 
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5.5 Discussion 
Some people may argue that our optimal retirement schedule is too drastic to be accepted 
by the public. In response to this potential criticism, we conducted a simple simulation with a 
small change from the current retirement schedule. That is, the regulator postpones the 
retirement of passenger vehicles from 2005 to 2006 and accelerates the retirement of trucks from 
2006 to 2005. This exchange in retirement timing can increase the net benefit by 13 percent as 
shown in the fifth column in Table 9. This simple simulation reinforces the importance of ex-
ante quantitative policy evaluations to improve the social welfare related to environmental 
regulations. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper empirically investigated the efficiency of the vehicle type regulation recently 
implemented in three Japanese metropolitan areas to mitigate air pollution problems. By solving 
an optimal problem of retirement timing, we find that the regulator can increase the social net 
benefit dramatically by changing the timing of the ban for each vehicle type. Our choice set of 
policy instruments is narrower than in the ideal world where economic instruments such as 
emissions taxes can maximize the social net benefit. On one hand, this restriction of alternative 
policy is disadvantageous since it does not realize the maximum social welfare, which economic 
instruments can achieve. On the other hand, this restriction is advantageous since it does not 
change administrative costs in the alternative regime compared with the current regulation. In 
other words, it assures the practicality and the feasibility of the alternative policy discussed in 
this study. Further, this analysis confirmed that a simple alternative policy can improve the net 
benefit dramatically. Even with a command-and-control approach there can be differences in 
cost effectiveness. 
Our results imply that two important points argue for conducting an ex-ante policy 
evaluation before legislating new policy. First, it is important to show multiple feasible alternate 
plans to assure high efficiency. Though the regulator showed only one schedule of terminal 
years, in legislating the NOx-PM Law we find that the social net benefit could increase by 104 
percent if the regulator had chosen the most efficient schedule of terminal years from among the 
alternatives. This fact confirms the importance of comparing multiple policy proposals. 
The second point concerns the importance of quantitative economic analysis in an ex-ante 
policy evaluation. The 2007 revision of the Japanese Government Policy Evaluations Act 
obligates the regulator to conduct an ex-ante policy evaluation of command-and-control policy. Resources for the Future  Iwata and Arimura 
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There are, however, several ways to evaluate a policy. Our quantitative economic analysis shows 
that there can be a large variance in the efficiency among feasible policies. This result implies 
that efficiency is an important indicator in choosing the most preferable policy from among 
alternatives. We suggest that the regulator should carry out a quantitative economic analysis as 
an ex-ante policy. 
In addition to air pollution problems, climate change has become an important factor in 
regulating the transportation sector. We have to address two issues in this regard. First, a life-
cycle analysis of vehicles is important, as Spitzley et al. (2005) point out. The acceleration of 
vehicle retirement speeds up the replacement of older vehicles with new ones. The production of 
new vehicles in the earlier timing will increase CO2 emissions in the short run. However, the 
impact of CO2 emissions increase from this process will be negligible in the long run because the 
NOx-PM Law requires the early retirement of old vehicles only once. Hence, we consider that the 
change of CO2 emissions over the life cycle due to the early retirement is limited. 
Second, the technological trade-off between NOx and PM reduction and CO2 reduction is 
worth discussion. Recently in Japan, CO2 emissions intensity among some small-size trucks 
deteriorated due to the technological trade-off. The improvement of fuel economy for larger 
trucks, however, is larger than the deterioration effect. Therefore, the amount of CO2 emissions 
may decrease overall. Needless to say, future ex-ante quantitative policy evaluations for air 
pollution regulation should include the impact on CO2 emissions. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Terminal Years under the Current Vehicle Type Regulation 
 
Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small
inspection
2002 2012 2011 2015 2013 2013 2013 2012 2012 2012 2012
2001 2011 2010 2014 2012 2012 2012 2011 2011 2011 2011
2000 2010 2009 2013 2011 2011 2011 2010 2010 2010 2010
1999 2009 2008 2012 2010 2010 2010 2009 2009 2009 2009
1998 2008 2007 2011 2009 2009 2009 2008 2008 2008 2008
1997 2007 2006 2010 2008 2008 2008 2007 2007 2007 2007
1996 2006 2006 2009 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006
1995 2006 2006 2008 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2005 2005
1994 2006 2005 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2005 2005
1993 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005
1992 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
1991 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
1990 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
1989 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2004 2004 2005 2005












Table 2. Number of Regulated Vehicles 
 
Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small
inspection
581,192 893,415 27,638 19,001 268,384 31,634 3,249 3,691 358,973 407,772 2,594,949
Vehicle
Type Truck Bus Special Use Vehicle Total Passenger Car
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Table 3. Life Remaining without the Regulation:  ) (u Lm  (Years) 
Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small
inspection
0 15.21 11.85 15.21 11.85 15.21 11.85 14.08 11.67 14.08 11.67
1 14.30 10.87 14.30 10.87 14.30 10.87 13.14 10.69 13.14 10.69
2 13.45 9.96 13.45 9.96 13.45 9.96 12.19 9.73 12.19 9.73
3 12.52 9.05 12.52 9.05 12.52 9.05 11.29 8.82 11.29 8.82
4 11.63 8.26 11.63 8.26 11.63 8.26 10.50 8.04 10.50 8.04
5 10.74 7.59 10.74 7.59 10.74 7.59 9.52 7.11 9.52 7.11
6 9.94 7.16 9.94 7.16 9.94 7.16 8.77 6.45 8.77 6.45
7 9.12 6.64 9.12 6.64 9.12 6.64 7.86 5.61 7.86 5.61
8 8.38 6.21 8.38 6.21 8.38 6.21 7.22 5.07 7.22 5.07
9 7.70 5.93 7.70 5.93 7.70 5.93 6.42 4.36 6.42 4.36
10 7.13 5.57 7.13 5.57 7.13 5.57 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
11 6.61 5.25 6.61 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.25 3.55 5.25 3.55
12 6.12 4.97 6.12 4.97 6.12 4.97 5.05 3.59 5.05 3.59
13 5.69 4.72 5.69 4.72 5.69 4.72 4.63 3.17 4.63 3.17
14 5.28 4.47 5.28 4.47 5.28 4.47 4.66 3.40 4.66 3.40
15 4.84 4.21 4.84 4.21 4.84 4.21 4.24 3.07 4.24 3.07
16 4.35 3.90 4.35 3.90 4.35 3.90 4.16 3.27 4.16 3.27
17 3.83 3.54 3.83 3.54 3.83 3.54 3.75 2.98 3.75 2.98
18 3.25 3.09 3.25 3.09 3.25 3.09 3.38 2.85 3.38 2.85
19 2.61 2.54 2.61 2.54 2.61 2.54 2.69 2.41 2.69 2.41
20 1.87 1.84 1.87 1.84 1.87 1.84 1.89 1.79 1.89 1.79
21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Passenger Car
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Table 4. Reduced Years under the Current Regulation:  ) , ( m rm rm L T Y  
Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small Standard Small
inspection
2002 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
2001 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
2000 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
1999 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
1998 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
1997 7.13 5.93 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
1996 7.13 5.57 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.94 4.10 5.94 4.10
1995 6.61 5.25 5.69 5.25 6.61 5.25 5.25 3.55 5.94 4.10
1994 6.12 5.25 5.69 4.97 6.12 4.97 5.05 3.59 5.25 3.55
1993 6.12 4.97 5.69 4.72 5.69 4.72 5.05 3.59 5.05 3.59
1992 5.69 4.72 5.28 4.72 5.69 4.72 4.63 3.17 4.63 3.17
1991 5.28 4.47 4.84 4.47 5.28 4.47 4.66 3.40 4.66 3.40
1990 4.84 4.47 4.84 4.21 4.84 4.21 4.24 3.07 4.24 3.07
1989 4.84 4.21 4.35 3.90 4.35 3.90 4.24 3.07 4.16 3.27
1988 4.35 3.90 3.83 3.90 4.35 3.90 4.16 3.27 3.75 2.98
1987 3.83 3.54 3.25 3.54 3.83 3.54 3.75 2.98 3.38 2.85
1986 3.25 3.09 3.25 3.09 3.25 3.09 3.38 2.85 2.69 2.41
1985 2.61 2.54 2.61 2.54 2.61 2.54 2.69 2.41 1.89 1.79
1984 1.87 1.84 1.87 1.84 1.87 1.84 1.89 1.79 1.00 1.00
Passenger Car











Table 5. Marginal Externality Costs of NOx and PM (ten thousand yen/ton) 
NOx PM
Cited from NETCEN（ 2002）Koyama and Kishimoto（ 2001）
Upper Bound French Upper Value
Point Estimate Middle Middle
Lower Bound Average of EU-15 Lower Value
Upper Bound 76.9 3192.6
Point Estimate 58.1 2276.3
Lower Bound 39.4 1360.0  
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Table 6. Terminal Years in the Optimizing Model (Point Estimate):  rm T  
Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small
inspection
2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2001 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2000 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1999 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1998 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1997 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1996 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1995 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1994 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1993 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1992 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1991 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1990 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1989 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1988 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1987 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1986 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1985 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1984 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
First
Registration
Year every two year every one year every two year
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Table 7. Optimal Terminal Years with the Lower Bound Estimate of MEC:  rm T  
Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small
inspection
2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2001 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2000 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1999 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1998 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1997 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1996 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1995 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1994 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1993 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1992 2004 Ex 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1991 2004 Ex 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1990 2004 Ex 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1989 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1988 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1987 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1986 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1985 2004 Ex 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1984 2004 Ex 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
Special Use Passenger Car







Ex = exempt. 
Table 8. Optimal Terminal Years with the Upper Bound Estimate of MEC:  rm T  
Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small Standar Small
inspection
2002 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2001 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
2000 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1999 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1998 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1997 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1996 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1995 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1994 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1993 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
1992 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1991 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1990 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex 2004 Ex 2004
1989 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1988 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1987 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1986 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1985 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
1984 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 Ex Ex Ex Ex
every two year





Year every two year every one year
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Table 9. Increase in the Social Net Benefit from the Current Regulation (one hundred 
million yen) 
 
Pol i cy Scenari o
MEC  Es t i ma t e s Poi nt





7, 073 5, 266 8, 959 910
Op t i mi zati on Si mp l e
Mo d e l
 
 
Note: The net benefit of the current regulation is 6,812 with the point estimate of the marginal externality 
cost. All are in discounted present value in 2004. 
 
Table 10. Robustness Check of Estimation Results: Increase in the Social Net Benefit 
from the Current Regulation (one hundred million yen) 
 
Poi nt





Pr of i t on Sal e 3, 575 3, 006 4, 908 859
Pr of i t on Sal e and
Repurchasi ng 3, 396 6, 284 3, 361 447
I nterest Rate 5, 967 7, 710 6, 657 587
Change  of
Assumpt i on
Op t i mi azati on Si mp l e
Mo d e l MEC  Es t i ma t e s
Pol i cy Scenari o
 
  
Note: On the column of “Profit on Sale,” “Profit on Sale and Repurchasing,” and “Interest Rate” the net 
benefits of the current regulation are 3,241, –1,421, and –3,552, respectively, with the point estimate of 
the marginal externality cost. All are in discounted present value in 2004. 
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Di esel  Truck
Ga s ol i ne Passenger Car
Di esel  P asse nge r C ar
 
 Note: The emissions standard is normalized by the emissions level in 1973 when there was no emissions 
standard regulation. Source: Hibiki and Arimura (2002). 
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Appendix 
The computation of the average life remaining  m L  was done as follows. 
First, the number of registered vehicles  ) (k Nm  with vehicle age k  was obtained from 
Survey on Vehicle Ownership in Japan for standard trucks, small trucks, standard passenger cars, 
and small passenger cars. The disposal rate  ) (k dm  is computed by using following equation: 
() ) ( / ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( k N k N k N k d m m m m + − =  
From this disposal rate, the survival rate  ( ) k sm  is calculated as 
0 1 ) 0 (
1 )] 1 ( 1 )[ 1 ( ) (
= =
≥ − − − =
k if s
k if k d k s k s
m
m m m  
Following Oka et al. (2007), we assume that no vehicles are used after 21 years. Using 










m ∑ = =  